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Abstract
Wage inequality has risen in many countries over recent decades. At the same
time, production has become increasingly concentrated in “superstar” firms. In
this paper, we show that these two phenomena are linked. Theoretically, we show
that shocks that increase concentration, such as an increase in consumers’ price
sensitivity, will also lead to an increase in wage dispersion between firms. Em-
pirically, we use industry-level data from 14 European countries over the period
1999–2016 and show robust evidence of a positive and statistically significant
correlation between concentration and the dispersion of firm-level wages.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, two important economic phenomena have received a large amount of
attention from academics and policymakers. On the one hand, there has been a strong
increase in wage inequality since the 1980s (Juhn et al., 1993; Katz and Autor, 1999;
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). A recent literature has shown that a large fraction of this
increase in inequality is driven by increased wage dispersion between firms, rather than
within firms (Card et al., 2013; Song et al., 2018; Barth et al., 2016). On the other
hand, a separate literature has shown that product markets have become increasingly
concentrated, with a smaller number of firms becoming increasingly dominant in many
industries (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2020; Autor et al., 2017, 2019; Grullon et al.,
2019; Kehrig and Vincent, 2018; Azar et al., 2017, 2018; Benmelech et al., 2018). So
far, the rise in inequality and the rise in concentration have been studied in isolation.
In this paper, we show that the two phenomena are related.
From a theoretical perspective, we show that a shock that increases concentration,
such as an increase in consumer price sensitivity (which in turn may be driven by factors
such as greater economic integration and the availability of new web technologies), will
also lead to increased wage dispersion between firms. Empirically, we use industry-level
data from 14 European countries over the period 1999–2016 to show that there is a
significant positive correlation between inequality and concentration, which is robust
to controlling for unobservable factors in a variety of ways.
We motivate our analysis using the heterogeneous firm search and bargaining frame-
work of Helpman et al. (2010). We analyze the implications of an increase in consumer
price sensitivity – modeled as an increase in the elasticity of substitution between vari-
eties in consumption, as in Autor et al. (2019).1 The model predicts that this type of
shock will lead to increased concentration of production in the most productive firms
within industries, while at the same time increasing wage inequality between firms
within industries.
Intuitively, an increase in price sensitivity shifts consumer demand towards the most
productive firms, who are able to produce goods at a lower price. Low productivity
firms are no longer able to operate profitably and must exit the market, while high
productivity firms are able to increase their market share. These highly productive
firms will increase both the quantity and the quality of the workers that they hire,
1The conceptual framework considered by Autor et al. (2019) features a competitive labor market,
which does not allow for any type of wage inequality.
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hence increasing between-firm wage inequality.
The link between concentration and wage inequality carries over to models featur-
ing other mechanisms that link firm performance to worker wages. For example, in
the setting of Egger and Kreickemeier (2012), worker wages are proportional to firms’
operating profits due to fair-wage considerations. A shift in demand towards the more
productive firms will increase their size and profitability, as well as the wages of the
workers that they hire, hence leading to increased concentration and increased between-
firm wage inequality.
We test the predictions of the model regarding the link between concentration and
inequality using data from the Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet). The
dataset provides information on concentration and wage inequality at the 2-digit in-
dustry level for 14 European countries over the period 1999-2016. Concentration can
be measured in terms of the sales or employment shares of the top firms within an
industry-country-year cell. Wage inequality captures differences in average labor costs
per worker across firms.
Our empirical strategy consists of regressing inequality on concentration as well as
various combinations of industry, country, and year fixed effects. This strategy allows
us to control for different types of confounding factors, and to exploit different sources
of variation for identification in order to determine the robustness of the results. Our
key finding is that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between
concentration and inequality, which is robust to various ways of restricting identification
– including, notably, when we exploit only variation within industry-country cells over
time. This suggests that, as predicted by the model, the two phenomena are indeed
linked to each other.
When we explore changes at different parts of the firm wage distribution, we find that
concentration is correlated with wage decreases at the lowest part of the distribution,
and wage increases at the top of the distribution. The relationship is non-linear, with
particularly strong wage increases at the 99th percentile. This suggests that the very
top firms are important in driving the increase in between-firm wage inequality – though
inequality is also higher in more concentrated industries, even if the firms in the top
1% are excluded. We also find that the positive correlation between concentration and
inequality is observed within most countries in our sample, and within almost all sectors
of the economy.
Our paper provides an important contribution to the literature by providing evi-
dence of the link between the growth of concentration and the growth of wage inequality.
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Our results highlight the importance of considering common driving forces that can ac-
count for both of these patterns. We contribute to the literature that studies changes
in wage inequality by proposing a mechanism which gives a relevant role to firms in
driving the widening of the wage distribution. While several papers have documented
the increase in wage dispersion between firms, the literature on wage inequality has
mostly focused on the role of changing demand for skills and tasks, without allowing
for heterogeneous firms to play a relevant mediating role (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor,
2011, for a review of this literature). Studying the specific nature of the shocks that
favor the most productive firms in an industry remains a promising avenue for future
research on the drivers of wage inequality.
2 Theoretical Motivation
In order to motivate our analysis of the relationship between concentration and inequal-
ity, we illustrate the theoretical link between these two variables within the closed-
economy framework of Helpman et al. (2010). Their model introduces Diamond–
Mortensen–Pissarides (Diamond, 1982a,b; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) search and
matching frictions into a Melitz (2003) model with heterogeneous firms. The model is
able to generate wage differences between firms through a combination of: (i) search
frictions and wage bargaining, and (ii) heterogeneous match-specific ability and the
availability of a screening technology.2 We refer the reader to the Helpman et al. (2010)
paper for full details on their model. Here, we focus on the implications of their equi-
librium conditions for concentration and between-firm wage inequality. In particular,
we focus on the implications of an increase in consumer price sensitivity, modeled as
an increase in the price elasticity of demand, as in Autor et al. (2019). Autor et al.
(2019) discuss how consumers may have become more price-sensitive due to greater
product market competition (e.g., through globalization) or new technologies (e.g., due
to greater availability of price comparisons on the Internet). While Autor et al. (2019)
consider the implications of this type of shock within the setting of a competitive labor
2Note that in this model, match-specific ability and screening are crucial ingredients to generate
wage variation across firms. Search frictions and wage bargaining alone are not sufficient to generate
between-firm wage heterogeneity (see for instance Felbermayr et al. (2011)). The intuition is that,
in a standard search and bargaining model with heterogeneous firms, the additional value created by
the marginal worker is identical across firms in the presence of a common search cost. Thus, more
productive firms will be larger, but wages will be equated across firms with different productivity
levels.
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market (with no wage inequality), we extend their analysis in order to consider the
implications within the context of a framework that allows for wage inequality.
2.1 Key Features of the Helpman et al. (2010) Model
As in Melitz (2003), each sector features a continuum of horizontally differentiated
varieties, with total consumption Q being given by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) aggregate:
Q =
[∫
j∈J
q(j)βdj
]1/β
,
where j indexes varieties, J is the set of varieties within the sector, q(j) denotes con-
sumption of variety j and β ∈ (0, 1) is a function of the elasticity of substitution
between varieties, σ, namely β ≡ (σ − 1)/σ. The product market is characterized by a
continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each producing a unique variety and
facing a fixed cost of production. Firm output is given by:
y = θhγa, 0 < γ < 1
where θ is the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity draw, h is the measure of workers hired
and a denotes the average match-specific ability of these workers. The productivity
distribution, G(θ), is assumed to be Pareto with shape parameter z.3
Workers are ex-ante identical but differ in terms of their match-specific ability, which
is not transferable across firms. In the Appendix, we discuss an extension of Helpman
et al. (2010) to two types of workers that allows us to relate increased concentration and
wage inequality to changes in worker sorting on observables. We discuss this extension
in further detail below, but for now we focus on the setting with ex-ante homogenous
workers. Workers’ match-specific ability is drawn from a Pareto distribution, Ga(a) =
1− (amin/a)k. This ability is not directly observable when a firm and a worker match,
but firms have access to a screening technology. In particular, by paying a screening
cost of caδc/δ, a firm can identify workers with an ability threshold below ac. Neither
the firm nor the workers know the match-specific abilities of individual workers, so
bargaining occurs under conditions of symmetric information.
3The assumption of a Pareto distribution is common in the literature on heterogeneous firms.
Corcos et al. (2012) find empirical support for this assumption; Axtell (2001) shows that the observed
distribution of firm sizes follows a Pareto distribution.
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In equilibrium, more productive firms have incentives to screen more intensively,
due to the complementarity between workers’ abilities and firm productivity. Hence,
more productive firms will hire workers with higher match-specific abilities and will
pay higher wages. Intuitively, firms are able to adjust their bargained wage down to
the replacement cost of a worker. Since more productive firms hire workers of higher
average ability, their workers are costlier to replace, and hence are paid a higher wage.
From the perspective of the worker, the expected wage conditional on being sampled
is the same across all firms. Under the assumption that δ > k, more productive firms
will also be larger.
Equilibrium firm-level revenues, employment and wages are given by:
r(θ) = rd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
, rd ≡ 1 + βγ
Γ
fd
h(θ) = hd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
(1−k/δ)
, hd ≡ βγ
Γ
fd
b
[
β(1− γk)
Γ
fd
caδmin
]−k/δ
w(θ) = wd
(
θ
θd
)βk
δΓ
, wd ≡ b
[
β(1− γk)
Γ
fd
caδmin
]k/δ
where θd is the equilibrium productivity threshold. As is standard in heterogeneous firm
frameworks (such as Melitz (2003)), only firms with idiosyncratic productivity draws
above the threshold θd will choose to remain in operation. b is the search cost, fd is
the fixed cost of production, and Γ ≡ 1− βγ − β
δ
(1− γk), where, as in Helpman et al.
(2010), it is assumed that 0 < γk < 1 so that firms have an incentive to screen.
2.2 Concentration and Wage Inequality
In order to measure concentration, consider the set of firms in the top µ% of the produc-
tivity distribution (among operating firms).4 The equilibrium relationships described
above imply that the share of aggregate sectoral revenues accruing to these firms, and
the share of aggregate employment concentrated in these firms is given, respectively,
4Derivation details of the concentration measures and wage distribution can be found in Appendix
A.
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by:
Cr = µ
1− β
Γz C` = µ
1− β
Γz
(1−k/δ). (1)
Regarding inequality, we are interested in the distribution of wages across firms.
The equation for equilibrium wages implies that the distribution of wages across firms
is given by:
Gf (w) = 1−
(wd
w
) δΓz
βk
This is a Pareto distribution with scale parameter wd and shape parameter
δΓz
βk
.
Scale-invariant measures of inequality, such as the coefficient of variation, the Gini co-
efficient, or the Theil index, are decreasing in the shape parameter and are independent
of the scale parameter.
2.3 Effects of an Increase in Consumer Price Sensitivity
As mentioned, we consider the impact of an increase in consumer price sensitivity,
modeled as an increase in the elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ (as in
Autor et al., 2019). Our two key predictions are the following:
Prediction 1: An increase in consumer price sensitivity increases concentration in
terms of revenues and in terms of employment.
Proof: Given the definitions of β and Γ and since γk ∈ (0, 1), we have that:
∂β
∂σ
=
1
σ2
> 0 and
∂Γ
∂σ
= −∂β
∂σ
[
γ +
1
δ
(1− γk)
]
< 0.
It is then straightforward to show that:
∂Cr
∂σ
> 0 and
∂C`
∂σ
> 0.
Prediction 2: An increase in consumer price sensitivity increases inequality in firm-
level wages.
Proof: Recall that the shape parameter of the distribution of firm-level wages is s ≡ δΓz
βk
.
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Given the definitions of β and Γ, is is straightforward to show that:
∂s
∂σ
< 0.
A decrease in the shape parameter will unambiguously increase any scale-invariant
measure of inequality.
2.4 Intuition
Intuitively, a shock that increases consumers’ price-sensitivity will shift consumer de-
mand towards the lower cost varieties produced by higher-productivity firms. As de-
mand for the higher cost varieties produced by low productivity firms falls, they are no
longer able to operate profitably and must exit. This leads to an increase in the pro-
ductivity threshold θd. It is worth noting that, although the increase in the threshold
reduces the range of firm types that operate, under the assumption that productivity
is Pareto-distributed, this will actually increase the variance of productivity among
operating firms.5 Since employment and wages are proportional to productivity, the
exit of unproductive firms will increase the measured dispersion in employment and
wage outcomes across firms, even if there are no changes in the level of employment
and wages among continuing firms.
This increased dispersion due to the selection margin is compounded by the changes
in employment and wage choices among continuing firms. To meet increased demand,
high-productivity firms increase their output by hiring more workers and screening
more intensively, which leads to an increase in both employment and wages relative to
less productive firms. As a result, sectoral concentration and wage inequality increase.
Overall, the model highlights three channels through which wage inequality increases:
selection, differential firm growth and differential wage growth. By shifting employment
towards the most productive firms, the second channel leads to an increase in wage
inequality even if wages within each firm remained fixed. Since wages increase relatively
5Note that the productivity distribution among operating firms is a truncated version of G(θ). This
truncated Pareto has the same shape parameter z, but has a scale parameter θd. The variance of a
variable with a Pareto distribution is increasing in the scale parameter and decreasing in the shape
parameter, so as θd increases, the variance of θ among operating firms increases as well. Intuitively,
the increased selection due to the increase in the threshold θd increases heterogeneity across firms as
measured by the variance of productivity, due to the exit of a mass of firms with relatively homogenous
firm types, which implies a relative increase in the mass of firms towards the tail. Detailed derivations
can be found in Appendix B.
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more at the top of the productivity distribution, the last channel further exacerbates
the selection and differential firm growth effects in increasing wage inequality.
Note that the implications of an increase in consumer price sensitivity for concentra-
tion and wage inequality carry over to other heterogeneous firm settings that feature a
mechanism that links worker wages to firm rents. For example, in the fair-wage frame-
work of Egger and Kreickemeier (2012), workers adjust their effort according to whether
they perceive the wage that they receive to be fair. The “fair-wage” is anchored by a
firm-external point of reference (workers should consider their wage to be fair relative
to the wage of employees at other firms), as well as a firm-internal point of reference
(workers should consider their wage to be fair given their own firm’s performance). In
equilibrium, it is in the firms’ best interest to pay workers the fair wage in order to
elicit the optimal amount of effort.
In this framework, an increase in consumer price sensitivity also leads to a relative
increase in the demand for the varieties produced by the most productive firms. As
in the Helpman et al. (2010) model, this will lead to changes in selection through an
increase in the operating productivity threshold, and to increases in the relative size of
the most productive firms in terms of employment and sales (increased concentration).
The increased profitability of the most productive firms translates into higher relative
wages for workers in these firms, due to the fair-wage considerations. Hence, in this
model, increases in concentration and increases in (between-firm) wage inequality are
also linked.
2.5 Accounting for Sorting on Observables
The empirical literature has shown that there is an important role for changes in worker
sorting in accounting for the increase in between-firm wage inequality in several coun-
tries (Card et al., 2013; Song et al., 2018).6 There is also evidence that increased out-
sourcing opportunities have led to increased establishment specialization and worker
segregation (Cortes and Salvatori, 2019).
The model discussed so far only predicts increases in wage dispersion among ex-
ante homogeneous workers, without allowing for these empirically-relevant changes in
sorting patterns. In Appendix C, we consider the Helpman et al. (2010) extension that
features two types of workers (skilled and unskilled). We show that, in this setting, an
increase in consumer price sensitivity also leads to increases in both concentration and
6See also Akerman (2019).
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between-firm wage inequality. The increase in between-firm wage inequality in this case
is driven both by: (i) increased sorting of skilled workers to the most productive firms,
and (ii) increases in between-firm wage inequality conditional on (observable) worker
skill type. These predictions are consistent with the observed increases in between-firm
wage inequality documented in the empirical literature.
3 Data
In order to test the prediction of the model about the link between concentration and
inequality, we use data from the Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet). This
dataset draws on various administrative and public sources, and compiles information
for non-financial corporations with at least one employee in various European countries.
The latest edition of the data (6th vintage) provides information for 18 countries over
the period 1999–2016, though not all years are available for all countries. We focus
on the 14 countries which have representative data for the full universe of firms.7 The
data is made available at various levels of aggregation. We work with the finest level of
aggregation available in the public-use data, which is the industry-country-year level,
where industries are coded at the 2-digit NACE Revision 2 level.
A number of concentration measures can be constructed from the CompNet data.
We focus on three measures of concentration in terms of sectoral sales (turnover): the
share of sales in the top 1% of firms in each industry-country-year cell, the share of
sales in the top 10 firms, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration.
We also consider a measure of employment concentration based on the relative size of
the largest 1% of firms within an industry-country-year cell.8
Our measures of sectoral wage inequality are also constructed from the CompNet
data. Information is available on the distribution of labor costs per employee across
7The 14 countries are Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Due to missing data on some vari-
ables, Denmark, Netherlands and Romania are not included in all specifications. Representative-
ness is achieved through a reweighting procedure as detailed in the CompNet User Guide avail-
able at https://www.comp-net.org/fileadmin/_compnet/user_upload/Documents/User_Guide_
6th_Vintage.pdf. Although data for the Czech Republic is available, its use is not recommended
due to the very low coverage rate of small firms.
8More formally, what is available in the dataset is the volume of sales (employment) for the firm
at the 99th percentile of the sales (employment) distribution within each industry-country-year cell.
Since we do not observe sales (employment) for each of the firms above the 99th percentile of the
sales (employment) distribution, we assume that the top 1% of firms all have the same volume of sales
(employment). This implies that our concentration measure is a lower bound of the market share of
9
firms. This allows us to measure dispersion in average firm-level wages. It is worth
noting that these dispersion measures will capture both pure firm wage premia (i.e.
wage differences for otherwise identical workers), as well as sorting of workers to firms
based on observable or unobservable characteristics.9
Figure 1 displays the overall evolution of concentration and wage inequality across
the European countries in our sample.10 The solid line in the top panel displays the
evolution of between-firm wage inequality, measured as the weighted average of the
90-10 ratio of firm-level wages in each country-industry cell (where each cell is weighted
based on its share of national value added). The dashed line displays the evolution of
concentration, measured as the average share of revenues concentrated in the top 1% of
firms within each country-industry cell. Both series display an upward trend over our
sample period, confirming that both between-firm inequality and concentration have
been on the rise in Europe since the early 2000s.
In order to rule out the possibility that these patterns are driven by changing sample
composition over time (given that not all countries are observed in all periods, as we
show below in Table 1), we run separate regressions of inequality and concentration
on a full set of country-industry dummies, and compute the average residuals from
these regressions in each year. These average residuals will only vary due to changes in
concentration and wage inequality within country-industry cells over time. These are
plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 1, and confirm that the increases in inequality and
concentration observed in the raw data are not driven by changes in the composition
of countries or industries in our sample.
Appendix Figure A.1 shows that concentration in terms of employment has also
been on the rise in Europe, though the magnitude of the increase in employment con-
centration is smaller than for concentration in terms of sales.
the top 1% of firms. Specifically, we compute the market share of the top 1% of firms as follows:
s99th · [N>99]
s
=
s99th · [1% ·N ]
s ·N =
s99th · 1%
s
,
where s99th is the value of sales (employment) for the firm at the 99th percentile of the distribution, s
is aggregate sales (employment), N>99 is the number of firms within the top 1% of the distribution, N
is the total number of operating firms and s represents the average sales (employment) in the industry.
s99th and s are both observed in the data.
9Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these two components. As discussed above, the
extension of the model presented in the Appendix allows for both of these factors to drive between-firm
wage inequality in terms of levels and changes.
10Due to missing data, Denmark and Netherlands are excluded from these graphs, but they are
included in regressions that use alternative measures of inequality and/or concentration.
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Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the evolution of concentra-
tion and wage inequality for each of the countries in our sample. Columns (1) and
(2) indicate the earliest and latest year in which each country is observed, while the
remaining columns display the levels and the changes in inequality and concentration
observed in each country. As before, inequality is measured as the 90-10 ratio of firm-
level wages in each country-industry cell, while concentration is based on the share
of revenues concentrated in the top 1% of firms in a country-industry cell. National
averages are constructed based on each industry’s share of national value added in the
respective year. Column (5) shows that the increase in between-firm wage inequality
has been widespread across European countries. All countries except Finland, Romania
and Slovenia experience an increase in the 90-10 ratio of firm-level wages. Meanwhile,
Column (8) indicates that concentration has also been on the rise in most countries.
The share of sales captured by the top 1% of firms in each industry increases over our
sample period in all countries except Belgium, France and Romania.
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the evolution of concentration
and wage inequality across nine broad sectors.11 Column (5) shows that the increase
in between-firm wage inequality has been widespread across broad sectors in Europe.
Meanwhile, Column (8) indicates that concentration has also been on the rise in most
sectors. The share of sales captured by the top 1% of firms in each industry experiences
particularly large increases between 2004 and 2014 in the Information and Commu-
nication sector. The Manufacturing and the Wholesale and Retail Trade sectors also
experience fairly strong increases, at around 0.9 percentage points. In what follows, we
confirm whether these coinciding trends observed at the national and at the sectoral
level are also observed when focusing on variation within country-industry cells, while
accounting for various types of potential shocks through the use of different combina-
tions of fixed effects.
11For this panel, we restrict the sample to the set of countries which have consistent information for
all sectors over the 2004-2014 period, which are Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy and
Lithuania, except for the Real Estate sector which excludes Finland. In order to compute concentration
and inequality at the level of these broad sectors, we first compute sector-level measures for each
country, by averaging across 2-digit industries using industry shares of value added as weights. We
then compute an average across the seven countries in each year, giving equal weight to each country.
11
4 Findings
In order to explore the empirical link between concentration and between-firm wage
inequality, we exploit variation across industry-country-year cells in the CompNet data.
Our equation of interest is:
INEQict = αCONCict + γi + δc + τt + uict (2)
The dependent variable is a measure of inequality in firm-level wages in industry
i in country c at time t. The key independent variable is a measure of concentration
in industry i in country c at time t. In order to exploit different sources of variation
for identification, and to control for different sources of shocks, we experiment with
different combinations of industry, country and time fixed effects, as discussed below.12
Table 2 presents our main set of results. Our benchmark measure of inequality
is the log of the 90-10 ratio of the wage bill per worker across firms at the industry-
country-year level. Concentration is measured based on the distribution of firm sales
in the first three panels, and based on the distribution of employment in the bottom
panel. Each panel uses a different measure of concentration, and each column considers
a specification with a different set of fixed effects, as detailed in the bottom panel of the
table. All regressions are weighted using each industry’s time-averaged share of total
value added in each country. Using time-averaged industry shares allows us to rule out
any effects coming from changes in the industry structure within countries, while giving
equal total weight to each country-year cell.
In the top panel of Table 2, our concentration measure is based on the sales of the top
1% of firms. Column (1) presents a specification which includes industry, country and
year fixed effects. We find that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation
between concentration and between-firm wage inequality. The remaining columns of
Table 2 consider different combinations of fixed effects in order to exploit different
sources of identification. Column (2) includes country-year and industry fixed effects.
This would control for any country-specific policy changes that affect outcomes across
industries. Identification is achieved from differential variation across industries within
country-year cells. Column (3) includes industry-country and year fixed effects. This
would account for any country-specific differences in industry-level outcomes. Here,
identification is achieved from differential changes over time for a given industry within
12The inclusion of these different sets of fixed effects also alleviates potential concerns about the
cross-country comparability of the data sources underlying CompNet.
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a given country. Columns (4) through (6) include different combinations of two-way
fixed effects. Regardless of the source of variation used for identification, the positive
correlation between concentration and inequality remains. Even in the most restrictive
specifications in Columns (4) through (6), the coefficients remain statistically significant
at the 5% level or higher.
The second and third panels of Table 2 verify the robustness of our main result
using alternative measures of sales concentration. In the second panel, concentration is
measured as the share of sales of the top 10 firms in an industry-country-year cell. In
all specifications, the estimated coefficient is positive, and statistically significant at the
5% level or higher. The third panel of Table 2 uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of
market concentration. Once again, we find that the estimated correlations are always
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level or higher.
In the final panel of Table 2, we replace our sales-based measures of concentration
with a measure of employment concentration. This is analogous to the sales concen-
tration measure based on the top 1% of firms, but now using the relative size (in
terms of number of workers) for firms in the top 1% of the size distribution within
an industry-country-year cell. The results once again suggest a positive correlation
between concentration and inequality.
Appendix Table A.1 further explores the relationship between concentration and
inequality using the standard deviation of the wage bill per worker across firms as an
alternative measure of between-firm wage inequality.13 We also explore inequality in
the top half and the bottom half of the distribution, respectively, by focusing on the log
90-50, and the log 50-10 ratio of firm-level wages, as well as wage inequality between the
very top of the distribution (99th percentile) and the 10th percentile. The results show
that the relationship between concentration and wage inequality is generally observed
throughout the entire distribution, with the estimated coefficients being positive and
statistically significant in almost all cases. The magnitude of the estimated correlation
tends to be larger when we focus on the very top of the distribution.
In order to delve deeper into this pattern, Figure 2 analyzes the link between con-
centration and wages throughout the full distribution of firm-level wages. In particular,
we regress firm-level wages at percentile p in an industry-country-year cell on concentra-
tion in that cell, as well as industry-by-country and time fixed effects. The figure plots
the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals obtained from these regressions
13We exclude the top 1% of observations in terms of the standard deviation of the wage bill as they
are extreme outliers.
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at different percentile levels p, ranging from the first to the 99th percentile. Con-
sistent with our finding regarding the positive correlation between concentration and
inequality, we find that concentration is associated with a widening of the firm-wage
distribution. Wages at the bottom of the distribution are lower in more concentrated
industries, while wages at the top are higher. The higher wages at the top are partic-
ularly prominent when focusing on the 99th percentile, once again suggesting that the
very top firms play a role in driving the increase in inequality, though even if the top
1% is excluded, inequality would still be higher in more concentrated industries.
Next, we explore the extent to which our results hold within each of the coun-
tries in our sample. To do so, we run a series of separate regressions of inequality on
concentration for each country, including industry and time fixed effects. Panel A of
Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficient on concentration for each country, along with
the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The correlation between concentration and
inequality (conditional on industry and time fixed effects) is positive in nine out of the
12 countries in our sample, and is statistically significant at the 1% level for six of these
nine countries. This confirms that the results are widespread across European countries
and do not seem to be particularly related to country-specific institutions.
Finally, Panel B of Figure 3 explores the extent to which our results hold within
each of the broad sectors in our sample. In an analogous way to our country-specific
analysis, we run a series of separate regressions of inequality on concentration for each
broad sector, now including country and time fixed effects. We find that the correlation
between concentration and inequality (conditional on country and time fixed effects)
is positive and statistically significant in all but two of the broad sectors. The only
exceptions are the real estate sector, where the estimated correlation is negative (though
noisy), and the administrative support service sector, where the estimated correlation is
estimated to be close to zero. Overall, we conclude that the positive association between
concentration and inequality is widespread across different sectors of the economy.
5 Conclusions
We document a theoretical and an empirical link between rising concentration and rising
between-firm wage inequality. Conceptually, a shock that favors the most productive
firms in an industry (e.g. an increase in consumer price sensitivity, as in Autor et al.
(2019)), will increase the concentration of employment and revenues in those firms. In
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a setting that links firm demand to worker wages (e.g. the search and bargaining frame-
work of Helpman et al. (2010) or the fair wage framework of Egger and Kreickemeier
(2012)), the expansion of production in the most productive firms will be accompa-
nied by an increase in the relative wages of workers in those firms, hence increasing
between-firm wage inequality.
We confirm the empirical relevance of this conceptual link using data on concen-
tration and between-firm wage inequality for 14 European countries over the period
1999-2016. We indeed find evidence of a statistically significant positive correlation be-
tween concentration and inequality at the industry-country-year level, which is robust
to allowing for a variety of different combinations of industry, country and year fixed
effects. This positive correlation is also observed within most countries and sectors in
Europe.
Further understanding the driving forces behind the rise in concentration and between-
firm wage inequality, as well as the underlying micro-level adjustments occurring at the
firm level using detailed micro-data would be promising avenues for future research.
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Figure 1: Rising Concentration and Rising Between-Firm Wage Inequality in Europe
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Note: Inequality measures are based on the 90-10 ratio of firm-level wages at the industry-country
level. Concentration measures are based on the share of sales within the top 1% of firms in an
industry-country cell. The top panel presents averages across up to 12 European countries based on
the raw data, though the composition of countries varies over time given that not all countries are
observed in all years (see Table 1). The bottom panel accounts for these changes in composition by
presenting average residuals obtained from regressions of inequality and concentration on a full set of
industry-country fixed effects, hence capturing only variation over time within industry-country cells.
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Figure 2: Results across the Distribution of Firm-Level Wages
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Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals obtained from regressions
of wages at different percentiles on concentration, controlling for industry-by-country and time fixed
effects. Regressions are weighted using each industry’s time-averaged share of total value added in
each country. The concentration measure is based on the share of sales within the top 1% of firms in
each country-industry-year cell.
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Figure 3: Results by Country and by Broad Sector
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Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals obtained from regressions
of inequality on concentration. In Panel A, regressions are run separately for each country, controlling
for industry and time fixed effects. In Panel B, regressions are run separately for each broad sector,
controlling for country and time fixed effects. All regressions are weighted using each industry’s time-
averaged share of total value added in each country. The concentration measure is based on the share
of sales within the top 1% of firms in each country-industry-year cell. The inequality measure is based
on the 90-10 ratio of firm-level wages in each country-industry-year cell.
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Table 1: Change in inequality and concentration
Panel A: By Country
Inequality Concentration
Country t = 0 t = T t = 0 t = T ∆ t = 0 t = T ∆
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Belgium 2004 2015 1.03 1.14 0.11 12.60 12.25 -0.35
Croatia 2002 2016 1.37 1.58 0.21 15.45 16.40 0.96
Finland 1999 2015 1.11 1.03 -0.08 13.88 15.59 1.70
France 2004 2014 1.51 1.53 0.02 15.50 14.03 -1.47
Hungary 1999 2015 1.67 2.31 0.65 14.44 15.99 1.55
Italy 2001 2014 1.38 1.48 0.10 9.60 10.85 1.25
Lithuania 2000 2015 1.70 2.61 0.91 14.09 17.58 3.48
Portugal 2006 2015 1.21 1.53 0.32 14.44 14.84 0.40
Romania 2005 2015 2.27 2.06 -0.21 16.35 15.94 -0.41
Slovenia 2005 2016 0.98 0.91 -0.07 15.87 18.18 2.32
Spain 2009 2015 1.30 1.37 0.07 12.07 12.82 0.75
Sweden 2003 2015 1.59 2.10 0.51 12.32 13.84 1.53
Panel B: By Broad Sector
Inequality Concentration
Broad Sector 2004 2014 ∆ 2004 2014 ∆
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manufacturing 1.29 1.48 0.19 16.71 17.59 0.88
Construction 1.26 1.53 0.27 12.01 12.59 0.58
Trade 1.42 1.69 0.27 13.88 14.77 0.89
Transportation 1.32 1.59 0.27 13.40 14.11 0.71
Accommodation 1.28 1.47 0.19 10.44 10.33 -0.11
Information 1.78 1.97 0.18 17.80 20.06 2.26
Real Estate 1.94 2.25 0.32 13.73 13.60 -0.13
Professional 1.73 1.93 0.21 12.57 12.02 -0.55
Administrative 1.61 1.95 0.34 14.10 14.80 0.70
Note: In Panel A, t = 0 (t = T ) denotes the first (last) appearance of both inequality and concentration
measures in the data for the respective country. Inequality measures are based on the 90-10 ratio of
firm-level wages. Concentration measures are based on the share of sales within the top 1% of firms.
Due to missing data, Denmark and Netherlands are excluded from Panel A, but they are included in
regressions that use alternative measures of inequality and/or concentration. In order to compute the
sector-level averages in Panel B, we first compute sector-level measures for each country, by averaging
across 2-digit industries using industry shares of value added as weights. We then compute an average
across countries in each year, giving equal weight to each country. The sample is restricted to the
set of countries which have consistent information for all sectors over the 2004-2014 period, which are
Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy and Lithuania, except for the Real Estate sector
which excludes Finland.
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Table 2: Concentration and Wage Inequality
Dep var: log 90-10 ratio of wage bill per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Concentration (top 1%) 0.373 0.322 0.743 0.198 0.639 0.645
(0.078)∗∗∗ (0.071)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.079)∗∗ (0.095)∗∗∗ (0.061)∗∗∗
Obs. 7037 7032 7033 6980 6981 7027
R2 0.835 0.870 0.927 0.881 0.938 0.961
Concentration (top 10) 0.237 0.197 0.197 0.176 0.136 0.179
(0.036)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗∗ (0.054)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.064)∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗
Obs. 8175 8168 8174 8158 8165 8168
R2 0.689 0.814 0.811 0.842 0.845 0.922
Concentration (HHI) 0.183 0.231 0.154 0.503 0.286 0.33
(0.072)∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗ (0.083)∗ (0.065)∗∗∗ (0.103)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗
Obs. 8820 8813 8819 8798 8805 8813
R2 0.683 0.798 0.817 0.833 0.847 0.918
Concentration (Employment) 0.291 0.160 0.699 0.014 0.718 0.417
(0.084)∗∗∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗ (0.084) (0.101)∗∗∗ (0.067)∗∗∗
Obs. 7176 7171 7174 7121 7124 7168
R2 0.832 0.867 0.927 0.879 0.938 0.960
Industry FE Yes Yes
Country FE Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes
Note: Observations are at the country-industry-year level. All regressions are weighted using each
industry’s time-averaged share of total value added in each country. The concentration measures in
the top three panels are based on the distribution of sales across firms within each country-industry-
year cell.
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Appendix A Deriving Concentration Measures and
the Wage Distribution
Concentration Measures Let θ denote the productivity level corresponding to the
(100− µ)th percentile of the productivity distribution. The share of sectoral revenues
accruing to firms in the top µ% of the productivity distribution is given by:
Cr = 1−
∫ θ
θd
r(θ)dGθ(θ)∫∞
θd
r(θ)dGθ(θ)
= 1−
∫ θ
θd
θ
β
ΓdGθ(θ)∫∞
θd
θ
β
ΓdGθ(θ)
=
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
−z
. (A.1)
where the second equality is obtained using the equation of equilibrium firm-level rev-
enues r(θ) = rd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
, and the last equality uses the fact that with a Pareto distribution
g(θ) = zθ−(z+1) and 1−Gθ(θd) = θ−zd .
Finally, to express Cr as a function of µ, it is useful to relate
θ
θd
to the share of firms
with θ ≥ θ:
µ = 1−
∫ θ
θd
g(θ | θ ≥ θd)dθ
= 1− 1
θ−zd
∫ θ
θd
zθ−(z+1)dθ
=
(
θ
θd
)−z
.
1
It follows that θ
θd
= µ−
1
z . Replacing the latter equation in (A.1) we obtain an expression
for the share of revenues accruing to firms in the top µ% of the productivity distribution:
Cr = µ
1− β
Γz . (A.2)
The concentration measure of employment is obtained in a similar way by comput-
ing the share of sectoral employment concentrated in the firms in the top µ% of the
productivity distribution.
Wage Distribution Let θw denote the productivity level associated with w(θw) = w.
The wage distribution is given by:
Gf (w) = Pr [w(θ) ≤ w]
= Pr [θ ≤ θw | θ ≥ θd]
= 1−
(
θd
θw
)z
, (A.3)
where the last equality uses the fact that productivity follows a Pareto distribution
with shape parameter z. Finally, using the fact that w(θw) = wd
(
θw
θd
)βk
δΓ
, we have that
θd
θw
=
(
wd
w
) δΓ
βk and we can rewrite (A.3) as follows:
Gf (w) = 1−
(wd
w
) δΓz
βk
. (A.4)
Hence, firm-level wages are Pareto distributed with scale parameter wd and shape pa-
rameter δΓz
βk
.
Appendix B Productivity Threshold for Production
and Selection
In the closed economy version of the Helpman et al. (2010) model, the equilibrium
productivity cutoff for production is given by:
θd =
(
β
zΓ− β
)1/z (
fd
fe
)1/z
θmin. (A.5)
2
From (A.5) it is straightforward to see that
∂θd
∂β
=
(
fd
fe
)1/z (
β
zΓ− β
)1/z−1
θmin
(zΓ− β)2 > 0. (A.6)
Hence, an increase in the elasticity of substitution increases the productivity threshold
for production and leads to a reduction in the range of firm types.
Given that productivity follows a Pareto distribution, the variance of productivity
among operating firms is given by
zθ2d
(z − 1)2(z − 2) ,
which implies that an increase in θd will increase the variance of productivity among
operating firms. Intuitively, this is due to the exit of firms with relatively homogeneous
firm types at the bottom of the productivity distribution and to the relative increase
in the mass of firms towards the tail.
Appendix C Concentration, Wage Inequality and
Worker Sorting
Helpman et al. (2010, Section 5.1) present an extension to their model that allows
for worker heterogeneity in observable characteristics. This makes it possible to also
think about the impacts operating through the increased sorting of good workers to
good firms in terms of observables. Here we illustrate the key features of this extension
to the model, and derive the key predictions of interest for our purposes regarding
concentration and between-firm wage inequality.
Consider an economy with two types of workers, ` = H,L, with H denoting skilled
workers and L unskilled workers. The production function is given by:
y = θ (aHh
γH
H )
λH (aLh
γL
L )
λL , λH + λL = 1 (A.7)
The match-specific ability of each group has a Pareto distribution with shape param-
eter k` and lower bound amin,`. Search and matching for skilled and unskilled workers
occur in separate markets, so search costs b` are allowed to differ by type.
Helpman et al. (2010) show that firm-level employment and wages for workers of
3
type ` are given by:
h`(θ) = hd,`
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
(1−k`/δ)
, hd,` ≡ λ`βγ`
Γ
fd
b`
[
λ`β(1− γ`k`)
Γ
fd
caδmin,`
]−k`/δ
w`(θ) = wd,`
(
θ
θd
)βk`
δΓ
, wd,` ≡ b`
[
λ`β(1− γ`k`)
Γ
fd
caδmin,`
]k`/δ
where now:
Γ = 1− β(λHγH + λLγL)− β
δ
[1− (λHγHkH + λLγLkL)]
The relative employment of skilled workers within a firm with productivity θ is given
by:
hH(θ)
hL(θ)
=
hd,H
hd,L
(
θ
θd
) β
δΓ
(kL−kH)
And the relative wage of skilled workers is given by:
wH(θ)
wL(θ)
=
wd,H
wd,L
(
θ
θd
) β
δΓ
(kH−kL)
For sufficiently high values of
wd,H
wd,L
, we have that in all firms, skilled workers are
paid more than unskilled workers, i.e. wH(θ)
wL(θ)
> 1 ∀θ.
Assuming that kH < kL, i.e. that the match-specific ability distribution is more
dispersed among skilled workers than among unskilled workers, we have that the relative
employment of skilled workers is increasing in firm productivity.
Average firm wages will be higher in more productive firms because they: (i) employ
a larger proportion of skilled workers, and (ii) pay higher wages to both worker types.
Hence, wages differ across firms both because of the composition/sorting of workers,
and because of firm premia conditional on worker type.
The concentration of type ` workers in the top µ% of firms is given by:
Ch,` = µ
1− β
Γz
(1−k`/δ) (A.8)
Given that kH < kL, we have that CH,h > CL,h.
4
We have the following prediction:
Prediction: An increase in the elasticity of substitution, σ, increases concentration of
employment in the most productive firms, particularly so for skilled workers:
∂Ch,H
∂σ
>
∂Ch,L
∂σ
> 0
Corollary: The disproportionate increase in employment concentration for skilled
workers implies stronger sorting of skilled workers to high productivity firms. This
increased sorting and the implied changes in the composition of workers across firm
types will increase between-firm inequality in average firm-level wages.
The distribution of wages across firms for workers of type ` is given by:
Gf (w`) = 1−
(
wd,`
w`
) δΓz
βk`
This is a Pareto distribution with scale parameter wd,` and shape parameter
δΓz
βk`
.
Inequality, as measured by any scale-invariant measure, will be a function of the shape
parameter only.
Prediction: An increase in the elasticity of substitution, σ, increases within-group,
between-firm wage inequality for both worker types.
Corollary: An increase in the elasticity of substitution, σ, increases inequality in aver-
age firm wages both because of (i) increased worker sorting and (ii) increased dispersion
in firm premia conditional on worker types.
5
Figure A.1: Rising Concentration: Sales vs Employment
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Note: Concentration measures are based on the share of turnover within the top 1% of firms, and the
share of employment within the top 1% of firms in an industry-country cell, respectively. The top panel
presents averages across up to 12 European countries based on the raw data, though the composition
of countries varies over time given that not all countries are observed in all years. The bottom panel
accounts for these changes in composition by presenting average residuals obtained from regressions
of each concentration measure on a full set of industry-country fixed effects, hence capturing only
variation over time within industry-country cells.
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Table A.1: Alternative Measures of Wage Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep var: Standard Deviation of wage bill per worker
Concentration (top 1%) 10.308 12.379 1.785 12.884 -3.991 5.951
(3.014)∗∗∗ (2.865)∗∗∗ (4.053) (3.088)∗∗∗ (4.714) (3.786)
Obs. 7780 7780 7776 7731 7726 7776
R2 0.54 0.603 0.662 0.656 0.715 0.725
Dep var: log 90-50 ratio of wage bill per worker
Concentration (top 1%) 0.415 0.443 0.166 0.435 0.089 0.243
(0.055)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗ (0.040)∗∗∗ (0.061)∗∗∗ (0.046)∗ (0.035)∗∗∗
Obs. 7635 7635 7629 7591 7584 7629
R2 0.547 0.575 0.899 0.598 0.917 0.927
Dep var: log 50-10 ratio of wage bill per worker
Concentration (top 1%) 0.246 0.169 0.560 0.100 0.591 0.374
(0.062)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗∗ (0.072)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗ (0.086)∗∗∗ (0.052)∗∗∗
Obs. 7037 7032 7033 6980 6981 7027
R2 0.805 0.863 0.892 0.878 0.906 0.948
Dep var: log 99-10 ratio of wage bill per worker
Concentration (top 1%) 0.376 0.351 1.020 0.118 0.882 0.956
(0.101)∗∗∗ (0.095)∗∗∗ (0.112)∗∗∗ (0.103) (0.127)∗∗∗ (0.096)∗∗∗
Obs. 6954 6949 6950 6894 6895 6944
R2 0.82 0.849 0.91 0.871 0.929 0.938
Industry FE Yes Yes
Country FE Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes
Note: Observations are at the country-industry-year level. All regressions are weighted using each
industry’s time-averaged share of total value added in each country. The concentration measures are
based on the distribution of sales across firms within each country-industry-year cell.7
